Operational Risk Management

Operational Risk Management
Simona Teodorovic
July, 2018

            Among safety critical industries, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) stand out regarding the many distributed levels of interactions in control and decision making. Due to the crucial interaction between the various elements of UASs, providing a safe environment for operations is making sure that each of these elements function properly.

            For the purpose of safely implementing and operating Small UASs (sUAS), the safety assessment process will evaluate whether the selected system(s) are sacrificing safety. This means that all possible impacts of an operations or system should be assessed and their combined safety effects analyzed.

            According to Netjasov, Mirkovic, Krstic-Simic and Babic (2018), a hazard is defined as “a result of a system or component failure and it can be anything that might negatively influence safety or an event or situation with possible harmful effects” (p. 309). They should be identified beforehand. However, both a reactive measure and a proactive process provide an effective way of determining hazards.

            The RQ-7 Shadow is a UAS highly used by the United States military. Instead of focusing on possible functions and failures, the starting point of a hazard identification is the safety of the operation (De Jong, Blom, & Stroeve, 2007). The goal of a hazard identification process is to obtain as many hazards as possible that could apply to the operation within the scope of the risk assessment.

         At a military base under consideration, the operation of a RQ-7 Shadow is analyzed. Following is an example of a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) with its corresponding risk level values (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Preliminary Hazard List (page 3 of 5)

Hazards may include any condition that might have the potential to generate various negative results. For this reason, the scope of hazards of a sUAS are wide. Hazards can originate from design factors, procedures and operating practices, personnel factors, regulatory related factors, etc. (Netjasov, 2015).

When a safety hazard has been identified, an analysis is required to assess its potential for damage. The PHL lists several hazards, the probability of their occurrence and the severity. Following, the risk matrix appoints values to the risk. According to Netjasov, “risks have to be managed to a level that is as reasonably attainable” (2015). The Residual Risk Level (RRL) is reduced by lessening the severity of the potential outcomes, after applying a mitigating response.

Brainstorming as a method for hazard and risk mitigation, usually requires inventiveness, resourcefulness and awareness for all possible solutions. Additionally, analyzing various outcomes for risk and hazard mitigation, it is a common occurrence that not all have the same capability for reducing risks (Garriga, 2014).

Although this approach for hazard assessment has many advantages, such as being used by non-system experts and capturing a wide range of previous knowledge and experience, the disadvantages are far greater. Issues such as a limited use when dealing with novel systems and missing hazards that have not been previously seen and documented might degrade the use of the checklist. Accordingly, applying a Structured What-if (SWIFT) technique might be more adequate. This method would consider a complete multidisciplinary team of experts under the direction of a Chairman. It ensures reliability, detailed records and less time for the identification. However, this technique does require extensive preparation (Netjasov, 2015).

           

           

References

De Jong, H., Blom, H. A. P., & Stroeve, S. H. (2007). How to identify unimaginable hazards? 25^th International System Safety Conference ISSC. Baltimore, USA. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255970182_How_to_identify_unimaginable_hazards

International Civil Aviation Organization (2014). Safety assessments for aerodromes. Retrieved from https://www.icao.int/NACC/Documents/Meetings/2014/SMSF1/P10.pdf .

Netjasov, F. (2015). Introduction to risk and safety of air navigation. Belgrade, Serbia: Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering.

Netjasov, F., Mirkovic, B., Krstic-Simic, T., & Babic, O. (2018). Hazard identification approach for future highly-automated air traffic management concepts of operation: Experiences from the Autopace Project. WIT Transactions on the Built Environment, 174, 303-315. doi:10.2495/SAFE170281